Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions

From: Jeff Davis <pgsql(at)j-davis(dot)com>
To: Ashutosh Sharma <ashu(dot)coek88(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: Ashutosh Bapat <ashutosh(dot)bapat(dot)oss(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
Date: 2024-06-06 16:53:19
Message-ID: b84e64d4c3e50a727b2f9b7f1d61dbfd35c9e636.camel@j-davis.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-hackers

On Thu, 2024-06-06 at 21:17 +0530, Ashutosh Sharma wrote:
> That can be controlled via some GUC if needed, I guess.

That's a possibility, but it's easy to create a mess that way. I don't
necessarily oppose it, but we'd need some pretty strong agreement that
we are somehow moving users in a better direction and not just creating
two behaviors that last forever.

I also think there should be a way to explicitly request the old
behavior -- obtaining search_path from the session -- regardless of how
the GUC is set.

> I didn't get you completely here. w.r.t extensions how will this have
> an impact if we set the search_path for definer functions. 

If we only set the search path for SECURITY DEFINER functions, I don't
think that solves the whole problem.

Regards,
Jeff Davis

In response to

Responses

Browse pgsql-hackers by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Isaac Morland 2024-06-06 18:09:55 Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
Previous Message Robert Haas 2024-06-06 16:36:32 Re: Assert in heapgettup_pagemode() fails due to underlying buffer change