Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions

From: Isaac Morland <isaac(dot)morland(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Jeff Davis <pgsql(at)j-davis(dot)com>
Cc: Ashutosh Sharma <ashu(dot)coek88(at)gmail(dot)com>, Ashutosh Bapat <ashutosh(dot)bapat(dot)oss(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
Date: 2024-06-06 18:09:55
Message-ID: CAMsGm5cThueMPSKugXw6bLu0sgJNz1R0EOfhZW1-kytUZxFH_w@mail.gmail.com
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On Thu, 6 Jun 2024 at 12:53, Jeff Davis <pgsql(at)j-davis(dot)com> wrote:

> > I didn't get you completely here. w.r.t extensions how will this have
> > an impact if we set the search_path for definer functions.
>
> If we only set the search path for SECURITY DEFINER functions, I don't
> think that solves the whole problem.

Indeed. While the ability for a caller to set the search_path for a
security definer functions introduces security problems that are different
than for security invoker functions, it's still weird for the behaviour of
a function to depend on the caller's search_path. It’s even weirder for the
default search path behaviour to be different depending on whether or not
the function is security definer.

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