Protection of debugging options

From: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>
To: PostgreSQL Development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Protection of debugging options
Date: 2000-06-06 16:07:44
Message-ID: Pine.LNX.4.21.0006061615560.3957-100000@localhost.localdomain
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Every Joe User can currently run

env PGOPTIONS='-d99 -tpa -tpl -te' psql

and stuff the server log with relative garbage that he will never be able
to see anyway.

As I don't believe it feasible to do superuser checking before the options
parsing it seems to me that these option in particular (and -s as well)
need to be "secure". Those desiring to diagnose transient problems can use
SET debug_level, etc. which does have a superuser check in place. For
permanent debug level changes there's of course this shiny new
configuration file and the HUP signal.

Comments?

--
Peter Eisentraut Sernanders väg 10:115
peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net 75262 Uppsala
http://yi.org/peter-e/ Sweden

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