| From: | Claudio Freire <klaussfreire(at)gmail(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas(at)vmware(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Peter Geoghegan <pg(at)heroku(dot)com>, Arthur Silva <arthurprs(at)gmail(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: reducing our reliance on MD5 |
| Date: | 2015-02-11 21:30:53 |
| Message-ID: | CAGTBQpZYFPSDe-Upm+iBhQZHQKHMybzdG8ta6iPOn+knExqFgw@mail.gmail.com |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 5:25 PM, Heikki Linnakangas
<hlinnakangas(at)vmware(dot)com> wrote:
> On 02/11/2015 06:35 AM, Claudio Freire wrote:
>>
>> Usually because handshakes use a random salt on both sides. Not sure
>> about pg's though, but in general collision strength is required but
>> not slowness, they're not bruteforceable.
>
>
> To be precise: collision resistance is usually not important for hashes used
> in authentication handshakes. Not for our MD5 authentication method anyway;
> otherwise we'd be screwed. What you need is resistance to pre-image attacks.
AFAIK, if I find a colliding string to the MD5 stored in pg_authid, I
can specify that to libpq and get authenticated.
Am I missing something?
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