From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
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To: | Heikki Linnakangas <heikki(dot)linnakangas(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
Cc: | Itagaki Takahiro <itagaki(dot)takahiro(at)oss(dot)ntt(dot)co(dot)jp>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: New types for transparent encryption |
Date: | 2009-07-07 17:38:07 |
Message-ID: | 9836.1246988287@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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Heikki Linnakangas <heikki(dot)linnakangas(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> writes:
> Itagaki Takahiro wrote:
>> CREATE TYPE encrypted_text (
>> INPUT = pgp_sym_encrypt_text(textin($1), passward(), options()),
>> OUTPUT = textout(pgp_sym_decrypt_text($1, passward(), options())),
>> LIKE bytea
>> );
>>
>> passward() and options() are SQL functions and we can re-define them
>> if needed. The default implementations are to refer custom GUC variables
>> (pgcrypto.password and pgcrypto.options) so that encryption are done
>> only in database server and applications don't have to know the details.
> What kind of attacks would this protect against?
I agree that this seems more like offering security theater than real
security. I'm also pretty concerned about the implications of a
datatype whose I/O operations fundamentally don't work without knowledge
of values that are supposed to be kept secret. What is your expectation
for how pg_dump will handle such columns?
regards, tom lane
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