Re: [HACKERS] Re: Hashing passwords (was Updated TODO list)

From: Mattias Kregert <matti(at)algonet(dot)se>
To: Gene Sokolov <hook(at)aktrad(dot)ru>
Cc: Louis Bertrand <louis(at)bertrandtech(dot)on(dot)ca>, Bruce Momjian <maillist(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgreSQL(dot)org
Subject: Re: [HACKERS] Re: Hashing passwords (was Updated TODO list)
Date: 1999-07-12 11:33:03
Message-ID: 3789D26F.FE15EBD1@algonet.se
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I found this at freshmeat.net:
------------------------------
Secure Remote Password (SRP) is a password-based authentication and
key exchange mechanism where no information about the password is
leaked during the authentication process. It does not require any
public
key cryptography, yet even if one were to eavesdrop on the
authentication process, no information which would aid in guessing
the
password can be obtained (in theory). There are some reworked Telnet
and FTP clients and servers available already.
http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/

It stores encrypted passwords on the server (not simple XOR), sends
different
data over the wire every time, it's is impossible to listen on the wire
and
compute the password (even with the simplest passwords).

see http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/design.html

/* m */

Gene Sokolov wrote:
>
> I completely agree with Louis. It's not just the hacker: there is no need
> for sysadmin to know passwords as well. I believe the security scheme where
> sysadmin or anyone has to take action in order *not* to see passwords is
> flawed.
>
> I think the following solution would be satisfactory:
> Store SHA(password) XOR SHA(mastervalue [+] uid). In case it's difficult to
> alter the wire protocol, store password XOR SHA(mastervalue [+] uid). Either
> way no one can get useful info without knowing the master value. Even simple
> password XOR <mastervalue> would be helpful.
>
> Gene Sokolov.
>
> From: Louis Bertrand <louis(at)bertrandtech(dot)on(dot)ca>
> > Why should anyone be able to read cleartext passwords, or even need to?
> > People have a habit of reusing the same password for logins elsewhere.
> > Hash the password as it's entered and compare hashes. This way, even if
> > the password file (PostgreSQL's or the system's) is compromised, the
> > attacker gains no extra information.
> >
> > > > From: Bruce Momjian <maillist(at)candle(dot)pha(dot)pa(dot)us>
> > > Yes, I remember now. We keep them in clear, because we send random
> > > salt-encrypted versions over the wire. Only Postgresql can read this
> > > table.

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