From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
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To: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> |
Cc: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: pg_upgrade using appname to lock out other users |
Date: | 2011-06-17 20:20:17 |
Message-ID: | 23618.1308342017@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> writes:
> On ons, 2011-06-15 at 17:50 -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
>> Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> writes:
>>> Peter Eisentraut wrote:
>>>> On non-Windows servers you could get this even safer by disabling the
>>>> TCP/IP socket altogether, and placing the Unix-domain socket in a
>>>> private temporary directory. The "port" wouldn't actually matter then.
>>> Yes, it would be nice to just create the socket in the current
>>> directory. The fact it doesn't work on Windows would cause our docs to
>>> have to differ for Windows, which seems unfortunate.
>> It still wouldn't be bulletproof against someone running as the postgres
>> user, so probably not worth the trouble.
> But the postgres user would normally be the DBA itself, so it'd be his
> own fault. I don't see how you can easily make any process safe from
> interference by the same user account.
Well, the point here is that it's not bulletproof, it's just making it
incrementally harder to connect accidentally. Given that Windows
wouldn't be covered, I don't see that it's worth the trouble compared to
just switching to a nondefault port number. (Am I wrong to think that
Windows users are more likely to mess up here?)
regards, tom lane
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