Re: Two-phase commit security restrictions

From: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)dcc(dot)uchile(dot)cl>
To: David Garamond <lists(at)zara(dot)6(dot)isreserved(dot)com>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Two-phase commit security restrictions
Date: 2004-10-13 18:20:22
Message-ID: 20041013182022.GA10052@dcc.uchile.cl
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On Wed, Oct 13, 2004 at 11:58:21PM +0700, David Garamond wrote:
> Heikki Linnakangas wrote:

> >Another approach I've been thinking about is to allow anyone that knows
> >the (user-supplied) global transaction identifier to finish the
> >transaction, and hide the gids of running transactions from regular
> >users. That way, the gid acts as a secret token that's only known by the
> >transaction manager, much like the cancel key.
>
> Personally I prefer the last. It should be infeasible to crack as long
> as the gid is long enough (e.g. sufficiently random 128bit value or
> more) and the channel between the TM and Postgres is secure.

So it is possible for a user connected to the DB to send random commit
or cancel commands, just in case she happens to hit a valid GID?

--
Alvaro Herrera (<alvherre[a]dcc.uchile.cl>)
"La realidad se compone de muchos sueños, todos ellos diferentes,
pero en cierto aspecto, parecidos..." (Yo, hablando de sueños eróticos)

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