Aw: Re: Putting the O/S user for "local" "peer" authentication in the "postgres" group vs chmod'ing the "pg*.conf" files to be readable by "all"

From: Karsten Hilbert <Karsten(dot)Hilbert(at)gmx(dot)net>
To: Laurenz Albe <laurenz(dot)albe(at)cybertec(dot)at>
Cc: Bryn Llewellyn <bryn(at)yugabyte(dot)com>, pgsql-general list <pgsql-general(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>, "Peter J(dot) Holzer" <hjp-pgsql(at)hjp(dot)at>, "David G(dot) Johnston" <david(dot)g(dot)johnston(at)gmail(dot)com>, Adrian Klaver <adrian(dot)klaver(at)aklaver(dot)com>
Subject: Aw: Re: Putting the O/S user for "local" "peer" authentication in the "postgres" group vs chmod'ing the "pg*.conf" files to be readable by "all"
Date: 2022-11-01 16:15:01
Message-ID: trinity-ef283834-3777-4429-a224-564a8e380707-1667319301502@3c-app-gmx-bap64
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> The client user should *never* read the PostgreSQL configuration files, so if changing
> the permissions (which you should *never* do) has an effect, you must be doing something
> very strange, like trying to start the database server with the wrong user.

It smells of trying to *embed* PostgreSQL ?

But that would not go with the account of multi-tenancy that's been presented.

Karsten

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