Re: BUG #18379: LDAP bind password exposed

Greetings,

* Tom Lane (tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us) wrote:
> Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> writes:
> > While I agree that users should take steps to secure their log files,
> > I'd argue that it's best practice to avoid dumping sensitive data into
> > log files, which it seems like it would be in this case. I'm not
> > suggesting that this is bug-worthy or that we should go to excessive
> > lengths to try and prevent every such case, but if someone showed up
> > with a reasonable patch to replace the sensitive information in a pg_hba
> > line with ****, I would be on the side of supporting that.
>
> I dunno, I think it would mostly serve to set false expectations.

I appreciate that concern. I don't think it will though.

> We've repeatedly rejected requests to scrub the log of passwords
> found in CREATE/ALTER USER commands, for example. I think some
> of the same issues that led to that conclusion would apply here,
> notably that a syntax error could lead to failing to recognize
> at all that some substring is a password. (A visibly erroneous
> pg_hba line would not get quoted in the specific context the OP
> complains of, but I'm pretty sure we'd print it while logging
> the configuration reload failure.)

While this may not be popular, I'd be in support of doing away with
support for cleartext passwords being accepted through CREATE/ALTER USER
commands, therefore eliminating this issue entirely. As discussed on
this very thread, passing passwords in the clear from the client to the
server, in any context, goes against best practices, which is why PG's
ldap auth method is discouraged as it does exactly that.

Doing this would, ideally at least, result in a lot more use of libpq's
PQchangePassword() and \password in psql, which would further reduce the
chances of a syntax error ending up dumping sensitive data into the log
(the server's SCRAM password authenticator would still be considered
sensitive and worthy of hiding, imv, but I wouldn't push as hard on that
as it's clearly less of a risk than the user's cleartext password).

Sure, mistakes could still happen and we couldn't do anything about it
(a user might *try* to pass in a cleartext password via ALTER USER *and*
have a syntax mistake), but now we're really looking at low probability
issues.

Thanks!

Stephen