From: | Nico Williams <nico(at)cryptonector(dot)com> |
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To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, Michał Kłeczek <michal(at)kleczek(dot)org>, Eric Hanson <eric(at)aquameta(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: SET ROLE x NO RESET |
Date: | 2024-01-03 23:47:19 |
Message-ID: | ZZXyB3aTBKagISrc@ubby |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Jan 02, 2024 at 12:36:38PM -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> IMHO, the best solution here would be a protocol message to change the
> session user. The pooler could use that repeatedly on the same
> session, but refuse to propagate such messages from client
> connections.
But this requires upgrading clients too.
IMO `SET ROLE .. NO RESET` would be terribly useful. One could build:
- login systems (e.g., bearer tokens, passwords) in SQL / PlPgSQL / etc
- sudo-like things
Though maybe `NO RESET` isn't really needed to build these, since after
all one could use an unprivileged role and a SECURITY DEFINER function
that does the `SET ROLE` following some user-defined authentication
method, and so what if the client can RESET the role, since that brings
it back to the otherwise unprivileged role.
Who needs to RESET roles anyways? Answer: connection pools, but not
every connection is used via a pool. This brings up something: attempts
to reset a NO RESET session need to fail in such a way that a connection
pool can detect this and disconnect, or else it needs to fail by
terminating the connection altogether.
Nico
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