From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
---|---|
To: | pgsql-committers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | pgsql: Restrict lo_import()/lo_export() via SQL permissions not hard-wi |
Date: | 2017-11-09 17:56:15 |
Message-ID: | E1eCr3n-0004y5-Rc@gemulon.postgresql.org |
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Lists: | pgsql-committers |
Restrict lo_import()/lo_export() via SQL permissions not hard-wired checks.
While it's generally unwise to give permissions on these functions to
anyone but a superuser, we've been moving away from hard-wired permission
checks inside functions in favor of using the SQL permission system to
control access. Bring lo_import() and lo_export() into compliance with
that approach.
In particular, this removes the manual configuration option
ALLOW_DANGEROUS_LO_FUNCTIONS. That dates back to 1999 (commit 4cd4a54c8);
it's unlikely anyone has used it in many years. Moreover, if you really
want such behavior, now you can get it with GRANT ... TO PUBLIC instead.
Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAB7nPqRHmNOYbETnc_2EjsuzSM00Z+BWKv9sy6tnvSd5gWT_JA@mail.gmail.com
Branch
------
master
Details
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https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/5ecc0d738e5864848bbc2d1d97e56d5846624ba2
Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/catalog/system_views.sql | 10 ++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c | 16 ----------------
src/include/catalog/catversion.h | 2 +-
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 10 ----------
src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out | 10 ++++++----
src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql | 2 ++
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
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