Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules

From: Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules
Date: 2024-04-25 16:16:16
Message-ID: CAOYmi+kfsRfopQRTuJwpsO50Urq=-gwYDJ1fWNkDr3oYM1wdjA@mail.gmail.com
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On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 2:20 PM Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
>
> Attached patch tries to fix and clarify those.

s/negotiatied/negotiated/ in the attached patch, but other than that
this seems like a definite improvement. Thanks!

> (Note that the client will only attempt GSSAPI encryption if it can find
> kerberos credentials in the environment.)

Right. I don't like that it still happens with
sslnegotiation=requiredirect, but I suspect that this is not the
thread to complain about it in. Maybe I can propose a
sslnegotiation=forcedirect or something for 18, to complement a
postgresqls:// scheme.

That leaves the ALPACA handshake correction, I think. (Peter had some
questions on the original thread [1] that I've tried to answer.) And
the overall consensus, or lack thereof, on whether or not
`requiredirect` should be considered a security feature.

Thanks,
--Jacob

[1] https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/e782e9f4-a0cd-49f5-800b-5e32a1b29183%40eisentraut.org

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