Re: Proposal: Role Sandboxing for Secure Impersonation

From: Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
To: Wolfgang Walther <walther(at)technowledgy(dot)de>
Cc: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres(at)jeltef(dot)nl>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Joe Conway <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, Eric Hanson <eric(at)aquameta(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Matheus Alcantara <matheusssilv97(at)gmail(dot)com>
Subject: Re: Proposal: Role Sandboxing for Secure Impersonation
Date: 2024-12-05 16:27:23
Message-ID: CAOYmi+=tT04+TpZb2WjSUx16TxOoyEULc_0+F8rQbb5HgGJd_Q@mail.gmail.com
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On Thu, Dec 5, 2024 at 12:47 AM Wolfgang Walther
<walther(at)technowledgy(dot)de> wrote:
> > If we want something like this, we'd want to allow
> > users to re-trigger SCRAM authentication. Which clearly requires a
> > protocol change.
>
> Yes. This. Re-authenticating without re-connecting.

The ability to reauthenticate would be useful for the OAUTHBEARER
mechanism as well. (Specifically, the ability to perform a new SASL
exchange on the connection after the first one has failed.) And it
would probably have overlap with the recent discussion around
pass-through SCRAM [1].

--Jacob

[1] https://postgr.es/m/27b29a35-9b96-46a9-bc1a-914140869dac%40gmail.com

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