Re: storing an explicit nonce

From: Ants Aasma <ants(at)cybertec(dot)at>
To: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
Cc: Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Sasasu <i(at)sasa(dot)su>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: storing an explicit nonce
Date: 2021-10-07 18:59:31
Message-ID: CANwKhkPXb3K1FgCicz92P6xTme6sq_EJUq1rM5Mz8YdhbuJwfA@mail.gmail.com
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On Thu, 7 Oct 2021 at 21:52, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> wrote:

> With XTS this isn't actually the case though, is it..? Part of the
> point of XTS is that the last block doesn't have to be a full 16 bytes.
> What you're saying is true for XEX, but that's also why XEX isn't used
> for FDE in a lot of cases, because disk sectors aren't typically
> divisible by 16.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption_theory
>
> Assuming that's correct, and I don't see any reason to doubt it, then
> perhaps it would make sense to have the LSN be unencrypted and include
> it in the tweak as that would limit the risk from re-use of the same
> tweak over time.
>

Right, my thought was to leave the first 8 bytes of pages, the LSN,
unencrypted and include the value in the tweak. Just tested that OpenSSL
aes-256-xts handles non multiple-of-16 messages just fine.

--

Ants Aasma
Senior Database Engineerwww.cybertec-postgresql.com

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