From: | Isaac Morland <isaac(dot)morland(at)gmail(dot)com> |
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To: | Mark Dilger <mark(dot)dilger(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
Cc: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, PostgreSQL-development <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers |
Date: | 2021-05-01 03:27:55 |
Message-ID: | CAMsGm5eDn7uBcit=aBvOSmUvPxrdpp1GZZyPVjL+9fUiYm_f8A@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Fri, 30 Apr 2021 at 22:00, Mark Dilger <mark(dot)dilger(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
wrote:
> Viewing all of this in terms of which controls allow the tenant to escape
> a hypothetical sandbox seems like the wrong approach. Shouldn't we let
> service providers decide which controls would allow the tenant to escape
> the specific sandbox the provider has designed?
>
I’m not even sure I should be mentioning this possibility, but what if we
made each GUC parameter a grantable privilege? I’m honestly not sure if
this is insane or not. I mean numerically it’s a lot of privileges, but
conceptually it’s relatively simple.
What I like the least about it is actually the idea of giving up entirely
on the notion of grouping privileges into reasonable packages: some of
these privileges would be quite safe to grant in many or even most
circumstances, while others would usually not be reasonable to grant.
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