From: | "David G(dot) Johnston" <david(dot)g(dot)johnston(at)gmail(dot)com> |
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To: | Joseph Koshakow <koshy44(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Laurenz Albe <laurenz(dot)albe(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Tomas Vondra <tomas(dot)vondra(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: Wrong security context for deferred triggers? |
Date: | 2024-06-22 22:22:25 |
Message-ID: | CAKFQuwbJnKm9qSmOpWEebbww4mHw4LLFLMbgZO3sept9veUapg@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Sat, Jun 8, 2024 at 2:37 PM Joseph Koshakow <koshy44(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
>
>
Something like
> `SECURITY INVOKER | SECURITY TRIGGERER` (modeled after the modifiers in
> `CREATE FUNCTION`) that control which role is used.
>
I'm inclined toward this option (except invoker and triggerer are the same
entity, we need owner|definer). I'm having trouble accepting changing the
existing behavior here but agree that having a mode whereby the owner of
the trigger/table executes the trigger function in an initially clean
environment (server/database defaults; the owner role isn't considered as
having logged in so their personalized configurations do not take effect)
(maybe add a SET clause to create trigger too). Security invoker would be
the default, retaining current behavior for upgrade/dump+restore.
Security definer on the function would take precedence as would its set
clause.
David J.
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