From: | Greg Sabino Mullane <htamfids(at)gmail(dot)com> |
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To: | Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: sunsetting md5 password support |
Date: | 2024-10-09 20:31:01 |
Message-ID: | CAKAnmmK73voOLA59G9sXjRuVZgNy8nT2Cmcxk-k6EZ3s3q+wOw@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Big +1 to the idea, but it's not going to be pretty; there is a lot of
baked-in MD5 stuff around.
> 2. In v19, allow upgrading with MD5 passwords and allow authenticating
> with them, but disallow creating new ones (i.e., restrict/remove
> password_encryption and don't allow setting pre-hashed MD5 passwords).
>
Certainly not remove it, that would break lots of things. Perhaps one
release with a strong warning when md5 is used, that cannot be disabled,
then disallow new ones?
> 3. In v20, allow upgrading with MD5 passwords, but disallow using them
> for authentication.
Again, maybe a release that complains real loudly but still allows it?
> 4. In v21, disallow upgrading with MD5 passwords.
You mean having pg_upgrade refuse to go on? Or maybe have it empty the
passwords out?
Cheers,
Greg
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