Re: pgsql: Use GRANT system to manage access to sensitive functions

From: Fujii Masao <masao(dot)fujii(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>
Cc: pgsql-committers <pgsql-committers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: pgsql: Use GRANT system to manage access to sensitive functions
Date: 2016-04-07 03:13:56
Message-ID: CAHGQGwHZtDitWgNVVNyusadt92QYoTYaEtGzXFzOSA1UpTC9YQ@mail.gmail.com
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On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 10:45 AM, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> wrote:
> Use GRANT system to manage access to sensitive functions
>
> Now that pg_dump will properly dump out any ACL changes made to
> functions which exist in pg_catalog, switch to using the GRANT system
> to manage access to those functions.
>
> This means removing 'if (!superuser()) ereport()' checks from the
> functions themselves and then REVOKEing EXECUTE right from 'public' for
> these functions in system_views.sql.

This commit revokes the execution privilege on pg_start_backup() from
a replication role. Doesn't this affect many systems that a replication
role is used to take a backup? This commit forces administrators of
those systems to manually grant the privilege to a replication role
when upgrading the system to 9.6.

Regards,

--
Fujii Masao

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