| From: | Fujii Masao <masao(dot)fujii(at)gmail(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> |
| Cc: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: FPW compression leaks information |
| Date: | 2015-07-08 02:27:10 |
| Message-ID: | CAHGQGwGuC9Cd+vQWz8GovswMw2=PR+RO9pdvq1oghDeCrsMSfA@mail.gmail.com |
| Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
| Thread: | |
| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:40 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
> On 07/07/2015 07:31 PM, Fujii Masao wrote:
>>
>> Or another crazy idea is to append "random length" dummy data into
>> compressed FPW. Which would make it really hard for an attacker to
>> guess the information from WAL location.
>
>
> It makes the signal more noisy, but you can still mount the same attack if
> you just average it over more iterations. You could perhaps fuzz it enough
> to make the attack impractical, but it doesn't exactly give me a warm fuzzy
> feeling.
If the attack is impractical, what makes you feel nervous?
Maybe we should be concerned about a brute-force and dictionary
attacks rather than the attack using wal_compression?
Because ISTM that they are more likely to be able to leak passwords
in practice.
Regards,
--
Fujii Masao
| From | Date | Subject | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Next Message | Fujii Masao | 2015-07-08 02:33:28 | Re: FPW compression leaks information |
| Previous Message | Tomas Vondra | 2015-07-08 01:03:16 | Re: multivariate statistics / patch v7 |