Re: libpq compression (part 3)

From: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres(at)jeltef(dot)nl>
To: Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
Cc: Jacob Burroughs <jburroughs(at)instructure(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: libpq compression (part 3)
Date: 2024-05-17 23:02:59
Message-ID: CAGECzQQ4iQ=bhtC4E_rVs6XYAgQMzcjvUr-rGRdKPkGT0VKqgA@mail.gmail.com
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On Fri, 17 May 2024 at 23:10, Jacob Champion
<jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> wrote:
> We're talking about a transport-level option, though -- I thought the
> proposal enabled compression before authentication completed? Or has
> that changed?

I think it would make sense to only compress messages after
authentication has completed. The gain of compressing authentication
related packets seems pretty limited.

> (I'm suspicious of arguments that begin "well you can already do bad
> things"

Once logged in it's really easy to max out a core of the backend
you're connected as. There's many trivial queries you can use to do
that. An example would be:
SELECT sum(i) from generate_series(1, 1000000000) i;

So I don't think it makes sense to worry about an attacker using a
high compression level as a means to DoS the server. Sending a few of
the above queries seems much easier.

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