pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)

From: Ranier Vilela <ranier(dot)vf(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Pg Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)
Date: 2021-02-10 01:01:45
Message-ID: CAEudQAoqEGmcff3J4sTSV-R_16Monuz-UpJFbf_dnVH=APr02Q@mail.gmail.com
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Hi Hackers,

Per Coverity.

Coverity complaints about pg_cryptohash_final function.
And I agree with Coverity, it's a bad design.
Its allows this:

#define MY_RESULT_LENGTH 32

function pgtest(char * buffer, char * text) {
pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
uint8 digest[MY_RESULT_LENGTH];

ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_SHA512);
pg_cryptohash_init(ctx);
pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (uint8 *) buffer, text);
pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, digest); // <-- CID 1446240 (#1 of 1):
Out-of-bounds access (OVERRUN)
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return
}

Attached has a patch with suggestions to make things better.

regards,
Ranier Vilela

Attachment Content-Type Size
pg_cryptohash.patch application/octet-stream 20.2 KB

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