| From: | Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Craig Ringer <craig(dot)ringer(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> |
| Cc: | Álvaro Hernández Tortosa <aht(at)8kdata(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Simon Riggs <simon(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
| Subject: | Re: Letting the client choose the protocol to use during a SASL exchange |
| Date: | 2017-04-14 12:26:44 |
| Message-ID: | CAB7nPqTAwqW7ktSZA6njEKVbhLFHU8ZVjqu4GNcv+OHCpj4yHQ@mail.gmail.com |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Craig Ringer
<craig(dot)ringer(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> wrote:
> There's no point advertising scram-512 if only -256 can work for 'bob'
> because that's what we have in pg_authid.
The possibility to have multiple verifiers has other benefits than
that, password rolling being one. We may want to revisit that once
there is a need to have a pg_auth_verifiers, my intuition on the
matter is that we are years away from it, but we'll very likely need
it for more reasons than the one you are raising here.
> Yes, filtering the advertised mechs exposes info. But not being able to log
> in if you're the legitimate user without configuring the client with your
> password hash format would suck too.
Yup.
--
Michael
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