From: | Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> |
Cc: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Julian Markwort <julian(dot)markwort(at)uni-muenster(dot)de>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, David Steele <david(at)pgmasters(dot)net>, PostgreSQL mailing lists <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Valery Popov <v(dot)popov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru> |
Subject: | Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol |
Date: | 2016-07-02 22:32:41 |
Message-ID: | CAB7nPqSidW+MCt8pN1_VujOxQGLaE==Z0emQk_iiUw__j_aE6w@mail.gmail.com |
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On Sun, Jul 3, 2016 at 4:54 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
> I took a quick look at the patch set now again, and except that it needs to
> have the multiple password verifier support refactored out, I think it's in
> a pretty good shape. I don't like the pg_upgrade changes and its support
> function, that also seems like an orthogonal or add-on feature that would be
> better discussed separately. I think pg_upgrade should just do the upgrade
> with as little change to the system as possible, and let the admin
> reset/rehash/deprecate the passwords separately, when she wants to switch
> all users to SCRAM. So I suggest that we rip out those changes from the
> patch set as well.
That's as well what I recall from the consensus at PGCon: only focus
on the protocol addition and storage of the scram verifier. It was not
mentioned directly but that's what I guess should be done. So no
complains here.
> In related news, RFC 7677 that describes a new SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication
> mechanism, was published in November 2015. It's identical to SCRAM-SHA-1,
> which is what this patch set implements, except that SHA-1 has been replaced
> with SHA-256. Perhaps we should forget about SCRAM-SHA-1 and jump straight
> to SCRAM-SHA-256.
That's to consider. I don't thing switching to that is much complicated.
> RFC 7677 also adds some verbiage, in response to vulnerabilities that have
> been found with the "tls-unique" channel binding mechanism:
>
>> To be secure, either SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS and SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS MUST be
>> used over a TLS channel that has had the session hash extension
>> [RFC7627] negotiated, or session resumption MUST NOT have been used.
>
> So that doesn't affect details of the protocol per se, but once we implement
> channel binding, we need to check for those conditions somehow (or make sure
> that OpenSSL checks for them).
Yes.
> Michael, do you plan to submit a new version of this patch set for the next
> commitfest? I'd like to get this committed early in the 9.7 release cycle,
> so that we have time to work on all the add-on stuff before the release.
Thanks. That's good news! Yes, I am still on track to submit a patch for CF1.
--
Michael
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