From: | Michael Paquier <michael(dot)paquier(at)gmail(dot)com> |
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To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Julien Rouhaud <rjuju123(at)gmail(dot)com>, Alexander Korotkov <a(dot)korotkov(at)postgrespro(dot)ru>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Peter Geoghegan <pg(at)bowt(dot)ie>, "Joshua D(dot) Drake" <jd(at)commandprompt(dot)com>, Greg Stark <stark(at)mit(dot)edu>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: 64-bit queryId? |
Date: | 2017-10-18 23:08:13 |
Message-ID: | CAB7nPqSRB4HNnX+cBPa55F_GDadhCVOWX_eKbhXNpL7T7hY4Zw@mail.gmail.com |
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On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 4:12 AM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 9:20 AM, Julien Rouhaud <rjuju123(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
>> Sorry for replying so late, but I have a perhaps naive question about
>> the hashtable handling with this new version.
>>
>> IIUC, the shared hash table is now created with HASH_BLOBS instead of
>> HASH_FUNCTION, so since sizeof(pgssHashKey) != sizeof(uint32) the hash
>> table will use tag_hash() to compute the hash key.
>>
>> tag_hash() uses all the bits present in the given struct, so this can
>> be problematic if padding bits are not zeroed, which isn't garanted by
>> C standard for local variable.
>>
>> WIth current pgssHashKey definition, there shouldn't be padding bits,
>> so it should be safe. But I wonder if adding an explicit memset() of
>> the key in pgss_store() could avoid extension authors to have
>> duplicate entries if they rely on this code, or prevent future issue
>> in the unlikely case of adding other fields to pgssHashKey.
>
> I guess we should probably add additional comment to the definition of
> pgssHashKey warning of the danger. I'm OK with adding a memset if
> somebody can promise me it will get optimized away by all reasonably
> commonly-used compilers, but I'm not that keen on adding more cycles
> to protect against a hypothetical danger.
A comment is an adapted answer for me too. There is no guarantee that
memset improvements will get committed. They will likely be, but
making a hard promise is difficult.
--
Michael
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