Re: Preventing non-superusers from altering session authorization

From: Joseph Koshakow <koshy44(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Preventing non-superusers from altering session authorization
Date: 2023-07-08 18:03:41
Message-ID: CAAvxfHfzRhoD98UXKE4DZpR5iwznMiehwsuqMzYhfQcnTwQ0Mw@mail.gmail.com
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Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:

> I see that RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION
> with a concurrently dropped role will FATAL with your patch but succeed
> without it, which could be part of the reason.

I didn't even realize it, but the change to superuser_arg() in v2 fixed
this issue. The catalog lookup is only done if
userid != AuthenticatedUserId. So RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION with a
concurrently dropped role will no longer FATAL.

Thanks,
Joe

On Sat, Jul 1, 2023 at 11:33 AM Joseph Koshakow <koshy44(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:

> >> That might be a good change? If the original authenticated role ID no
> >> longer exists then we may want to return an error when trying to set
> >> your session authorization to that role.
> >
> > I was curious why we don't block DROP ROLE if there are active sessions
> for
> > the role or terminate any such sessions as part of the command, and I
> found
> > this discussion from 2016:
> >
> > https://postgr.es/m/flat/56E87CD8.60007%40ohmu.fi
>
> Ah, that makes sense that we don't prevent DROP ROLE on active roles.
> Though, we do error when you try and set your role or session
> authorization to a dropped role. So erroring on RESET SESSION
> AUTHORIZATION when the original role is dropped makes it consistent
> with SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION TO <dropped-original-role>. On the other
> hand it makes it inconsistent with RESET ROLE, which does not error on
> a dropped role.
>
> - Joe Koshakow
>
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2023 at 1:54 PM Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 06:39:45PM -0400, Joseph Koshakow wrote:
>> > On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 11:48 PM Nathan Bossart <
>> nathandbossart(at)gmail(dot)com>
>> > wrote:
>> >> I see that RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION
>> >> with a concurrently dropped role will FATAL with your patch but succeed
>> >> without it, which could be part of the reason.
>> >
>> > That might be a good change? If the original authenticated role ID no
>> > longer exists then we may want to return an error when trying to set
>> > your session authorization to that role.
>>
>> I was curious why we don't block DROP ROLE if there are active sessions
>> for
>> the role or terminate any such sessions as part of the command, and I
>> found
>> this discussion from 2016:
>>
>> https://postgr.es/m/flat/56E87CD8.60007%40ohmu.fi
>>
>> --
>> Nathan Bossart
>> Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com
>>
>

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