From: | Jacob Champion <jchampion(at)timescale(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | "Jonathan S(dot) Katz" <jkatz(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Cc: | PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>, Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>, Dagfinn Ilmari Mannsåker <ilmari(at)ilmari(dot)org>, Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
Subject: | Re: User functions for building SCRAM secrets |
Date: | 2022-11-04 20:39:47 |
Message-ID: | CAAWbhmiOMgXFVAUZhVkXPA2+9-Wsjyxm7WXyEsy2viFDB-E0Sg@mail.gmail.com |
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On Tue, Nov 1, 2022 at 4:02 PM Jacob Champion <jchampion(at)timescale(dot)com> wrote:
> I guess I have fewer problems with this use case in theory, but I'm
> wondering if better client-side support might also solve this one as
> well, without the additional complication. Is there a reason it would
> not?
To expand on this question, after giving it some more thought:
It seems to me that the use case here is extremely similar to the one
being tackled by Peter E's client-side encryption [1]. People want to
write SQL to perform a cryptographic operation using a secret, and
then send the resulting ciphertext (or in this case, a one-way hash)
to the server, but ideally the server should not actually have the
secret.
I don't think it's helpful for me to try to block progress on this
patchset behind the other one. But is there a way for me to help this
proposal skate in the same general direction? Could Peter's encryption
framework expand to fit this case in the future?
Thanks,
--Jacob
[1] https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/89157929-c2b6-817b-6025-8e4b2d89d88f%40enterprisedb.com
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