From: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> |
Cc: | Sawada Masahiko <sawada(dot)mshk(at)gmail(dot)com>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, David Johnston <david(dot)g(dot)johnston(at)gmail(dot)com>, David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Proposal: knowing detail of config files via SQL |
Date: | 2015-03-02 21:47:01 |
Message-ID: | CA+TgmobnmuJdeO3H4x-mkC9ZK6K3-wroqRQx=WFSpOiT_LbcXg@mail.gmail.com |
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On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 12:27 AM, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> wrote:
> While this generally "works", the usual expectation is that functions
> that should be superuser-only have a check in the function rather than
> depending on the execute privilege. I'm certainly happy to debate the
> merits of that approach, but for the purposes of this patch, I'd suggest
> you stick an if (!superuser()) ereport("must be superuser") into the
> function itself and not work about setting the correct permissions on
> it.
-1. If that policy exists at all, it's a BAD policy, because it
prevents users from changing the permissions using DDL. I think the
superuser check should be inside the function, when, for example, it
masks some of the output data depending on the user's permissions.
But I see little virtue in handicapping an attempt by a superuser to
grant SELECT rights on pg_file_settings.
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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