Re: Disabling trust/ident authentication configure option

From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Michael Banck <mbanck(at)gmx(dot)net>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Josh Berkus <josh(at)agliodbs(dot)com>, Volker Aßmann <volker(dot)assmann(at)gmail(dot)com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Disabling trust/ident authentication configure option
Date: 2015-05-21 02:36:05
Message-ID: CA+TgmobL0c-6W4mogNtF1CHkzbWTSaD2ogMASj5+hdJZFFnZDA@mail.gmail.com
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On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 7:09 PM, Michael Banck <mbanck(at)gmx(dot)net> wrote:
>> I think Andres' point about "trust" being an essential disaster recovery
>> mode is something to consider, as well. That puts pretty strict limits
>> on what would be a credible replacement.
>
> Then let's rename it from `trust' to `disaster'... ;)

I still don't buy it. Say you have a server that connects on its own
VLAN every night to run a backup. What's wrong with trust? Would you
really be better putting it on a less-secure network and using a
password that will just have to be stored in a config file someplace?

Answer: No, you wouldn't.

--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company

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