Re: libpq compression (part 3)

From: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>
To: Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>
Cc: Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres(at)jeltef(dot)nl>, Jacob Burroughs <jburroughs(at)instructure(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: libpq compression (part 3)
Date: 2024-05-20 17:01:38
Message-ID: CA+TgmoaNFFeyy8x7KKPUxn3VS8MixM7Y1kFjmcbYBqLCfoYjLQ@mail.gmail.com
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On Mon, May 20, 2024 at 12:49 PM Jacob Champion
<jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> wrote:
> ...and my response was that, no, the proposal doesn't seem to be
> requiring that authentication take place before compression is done.
> (As evidenced by your email. :D) If the claim is that there are no
> security problems with letting unauthenticated clients force
> decompression, then I can try to poke holes in that;

I would prefer this approach, so I suggest trying to poke holes here
first. If you find big enough holes then...

> or if the claim
> is that we don't need to worry about that at all because we'll wait
> until after authentication, then I can poke holes in that too. My
> request is just that we choose one.

...we can fall back to this and you can try to poke holes here.

I really hope that you can't poke big enough holes to kill the feature
entirely, though. Because that sounds sad.

--
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com

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