| From: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> |
| Cc: | Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, José Luis Tallón <jltallon(at)adv-solutions(dot)net>, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, Craig Ringer <craig(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> |
| Subject: | Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION |
| Date: | 2015-05-19 18:41:06 |
| Message-ID: | CA+TgmoZESkjpaLna-2zWwUCtttYYbiGnB9Z0MEcV6NQLQM9xfA@mail.gmail.com |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:29 PM, Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> wrote:
> On 2015-05-19 10:53:10 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
>> That seems like a kludge to me. If the cookie leaks out somhow, which
>> it will, then it'll be insecure. I think the way to do this is with a
>> protocol extension that poolers can enable on request. Then they can
>> just refuse to forward any "reset authorization" packets they get from
>> their client. There's no backward-compatibility break because the
>> pooler can know, from the server version, whether the server is new
>> enough to support the new protocol messages.
>
> That sounds like a worse approach to me. Don't you just need to hide the
> session authorization bit in a function serverside to circumvent that?
I'm apparently confused. There's nothing you can do to maintain
security against someone who can load C code into the server. I must
be misunderstanding you.
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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