From: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> |
Cc: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us>, Ants Aasma <ants(at)cybertec(dot)at>, Sasasu <i(at)sasa(dot)su>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: storing an explicit nonce |
Date: | 2021-10-07 19:12:07 |
Message-ID: | CA+TgmoYxQwKBZYizANMbnwCkwmZQs7xw++TarZq3-E4OujkgHw@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 2:52 PM Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net> wrote:
> Assuming that's correct, and I don't see any reason to doubt it, then
> perhaps it would make sense to have the LSN be unencrypted and include
> it in the tweak as that would limit the risk from re-use of the same
> tweak over time.
Talking about things like "limiting the risk" makes me super-nervous.
Maybe we're all on the same page here, but just to make my assumptions
explicit: I think we have to approach this feature with the idea in
mind that there are going to be very smart people actively attacking
any TDE implementation we ship. I expect that if you are lucky enough
to get your hands on a PostgreSQL cluster's data files and they happen
to be encrypted, your best option for handling that situation is not
going to be attacking the encryption, but rather something like
calling the person who has the password and pretending to be someone
to whom they ought to disclose it. However, I also believe that
PostgreSQL is a sufficiently high-profile project that security
researchers will find it a tempting target. And if they manage to
write a shell script or tool that breaks our encryption without too
much difficulty, it will generate a ton of negative PR for the
project. This will be especially true if the problem can't be fixed
without re-engineering the whole thing, because we're not
realistically going to be able to re-engineer the whole thing in a
minor release, and thus will be saddled with the defective
implementation for many years.
Now none of that is to say that we shouldn't limit risk - I mean less
risk is always better than more. But we need to be sure this is not
like a 90% thing, where we're pretty sure it works. We can get by with
that for a lot of things, but I think here we had better try
extra-hard to make sure that we don't have any exposures. We probably
will anyway, but at least if they're just bugs and not architectural
deficiencies, we can hope to be able to patch them as they are
discovered.
--
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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