Re: backup manifests

On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 11:22 AM Rushabh Lathia <rushabh(dot)lathia(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
> Here is the whole stack of patches.

I committed 0001, as that's just refactoring and I think (hope) it's
uncontroversial. I think 0002-0005 need to be squashed together
(crediting all authors properly and in the appropriate order) as it's
quite hard to understand right now, and that Suraj's patch to validate
the backup should be included in the patch stack. It needs
documentation. Also, we need, either in that patch or a separate, TAP
tests that exercise this feature. Things we should try to check:

- Plain format backups can be verified against the manifest.
- Tar format backups can be verified against the manifest after
untarring (this might be a problem; not sure there's any guarantee
that we have a working "tar" command available).
- Verification succeeds for all available checksums algorithms and
also for no checksum algorithm (should still check which files are
present, and sizes).
- If we tamper with a backup by removing a file, adding a file, or
changing the size of a file, the modification is detected even without
checksums.
- If we tamper with a backup by changing the contents of a file but
not the size, the modification is detected if checksums are used.
- Everything above still works if there is user-defined tablespace
that contains a table.

--
Robert Haas
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