From: | Joshua Tolley <eggyknap(at)gmail(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | David Fetter <david(at)fetter(dot)org>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, Stephen Frost <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Josh Berkus <josh(at)agliodbs(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Specification for Trusted PLs? |
Date: | 2010-05-21 20:21:40 |
Message-ID: | AANLkTill27t27LfZ_c6fkxfhq5YTLlHKLkgK5fbTC-g7@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 2:04 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
> Joshua Tolley <eggyknap(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
>> Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the
>> database only by going through a database and calling some function to
>> which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent
>> to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a
>> function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an
>> untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT
>
> s/untrusted/trusted/ here, right?
Er, right. Sorry.
>
>> launch_missiles()".
>
> To me, as long as they go back into the database via SPI, anything they
> can get to from there is OK. What I meant to highlight upthread is that
> we don't want trusted functions being able to access other functions
> "directly" without going through SQL. As an example, a PL that has FFI
> capability sufficient to allow direct access to heap_insert() would
> have to be considered untrusted.
That I can definitely agree with.
--
Joshua Tolley / eggyknap
End Point Corporation
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