From: | Merlin Moncure <mmoncure(at)gmail(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Greg Stark <gsstark(at)mit(dot)edu>, Heikki Linnakangas <heikki(dot)linnakangas(at)enterprisedb(dot)com>, KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net |
Subject: | Re: [RFC] A tackle to the leaky VIEWs for RLS |
Date: | 2010-06-01 20:10:33 |
Message-ID: | AANLkTilAuZfb4oI7zT1I94DkO6PWk7tPEtWWaGT04Ul5@mail.gmail.com |
Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 1:28 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
>> Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> writes:
>>> On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 10:57 AM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
>>>> CREATE SECURITY VIEW, anyone?
>>
>>> That may be the best approach, but I think it needs more than one line
>>> of exposition. The approach I proposed was to test whether the user
>>> has privileges to execute the underlying query directly without going
>>> through the view. If so, we needn't be concerned. If not, then we
>>> start thinking about which functions/operators we trust.
>>
>> Ummm ... that makes semantics dependent on the permissions available at
>> plan time, whereas what should matter is the permissions that exist at
>> execution time. Maybe that's all right for this context but it doesn't
>> seem tremendously desirable.
>
> Ugh. I hope there's a way around that problem because AFAICS the
> alternative is a world of hurt. If we're not allowed to take the
> security context into account during planning, then we're going to
> have to make worst-case assumptions, which sounds really unpleasant.
>
>>> Perhaps there is some value to having a knob that goes the opposite
>>> directions and essentially says "I don't really care whether this view
>>> is leaky from a security perspective". But presumably we don't want
>>> to deliver that behavior by default and require the user to ask for a
>>> SECURITY VIEW to get something else - if anything, we'd want CREATE
>>> VIEW to create the normal (secure) version and add CREATE LEAKY VIEW
>>> to do the other thing.
>>
>> -1 on that. We will get far more pushback from people whose application
>> performance suddenly went to hell than we will ever get approval from
>> people who actually need the feature. Considering that we've survived
>> this long with leaky views, that should definitely remain the default
>> behavior.
>
> Eh, if that's the consensus, it doesn't bother me that much, but it
> doesn't really answer the question, either: supposing we add an
> explicit concept of a security view, what should its semantics be?
have you ruled out: 'create function'? :-)
merlin
From | Date | Subject | |
---|---|---|---|
Next Message | Peter Eisentraut | 2010-06-01 20:50:57 | Re: How to pass around collation information |
Previous Message | Robert Haas | 2010-06-01 20:04:02 | Re: is_absolute_path incorrect on Windows |