Re: Not clear how to switch role without permitting switch back

From: George Neuner <gneuner2(at)comcast(dot)net>
To: pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: Not clear how to switch role without permitting switch back
Date: 2017-01-10 17:09:01
Message-ID: 9u2a7c97nc6s60rdh39us7lpohhghf6lpb@4ax.com
Views: Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email
Thread:
Lists: pgsql-general

On Mon, 9 Jan 2017 23:05:47 -0800, Guyren Howe <guyren(at)gmail(dot)com>
wrote:

>For my Love Your Database Project:
>
>https://medium.com/@gisborne/love-your-database-lydb-23c69f480a1d#.8g1ezwx6r <https://medium.com/@gisborne/love-your-database-lydb-23c69f480a1d#.8g1ezwx6r>
>
>I’m trying to see how a typical web developer might use Postgres’
>roles and row-level security to implement their authorization.
>
>What I’m struggling with is that connection pooling seems to make
>straightforward use of the roles to enforce access impossible.
>
>If I’m using a connection pool, then I’m not re-connecting to
>Postgres with the user for the current transaction. But then my
>only option is to use SET ROLE. But that is not much security at
>all, because the current user can just do SET ROLE back to the
>(presumably privileged) default, or to any other user’s role.
>
>What am I missing here?

That middleware can control what a user is permitted to do.

YMMV, but to me "web application" means there is a server-side program
sitting in front of the database and controlling access to it.

I grudgingly will permit *compiled* clients direct connection to an
Internet facing database, but I am dead set against allowing direct
connection from any browser hosted code because - regardless of any
"shrouding" that might be done - browser code is completely insecure,
accessible to anyone who can right-click on the page.

George

In response to

Browse pgsql-general by date

  From Date Subject
Next Message Edmundo Robles 2017-01-10 17:22:34 Re: some amazing stuff
Previous Message Tomas Vondra 2017-01-10 15:05:52 Re: Slow index scan - Pgsql 9.2