Re: scram-sha-256 broken with FIPS and OpenSSL 1.0.2

From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel(at)yesql(dot)se>
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>
Cc: Peter Eisentraut <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi>, Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: scram-sha-256 broken with FIPS and OpenSSL 1.0.2
Date: 2020-09-24 19:44:57
Message-ID: 951343C8-43C6-4EA8-A02E-03E71889F543@yesql.se
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> On 24 Sep 2020, at 21:22, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 1:57 PM Peter Eisentraut
> <peter(dot)eisentraut(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com> wrote:
>> Depends on what one considers to be covered by FIPS. The entire rest of
>> SCRAM is custom code, so running it on top of the world's greatest
>> SHA-256 implementation isn't going to make the end product any more
>> trustworthy.
>
> I mean, the issue here, as is so often the case, is not what is
> actually more secure, but what meets the terms of some security
> standard.

Correct, IIUC in order to be FIPS compliant all cryptographic modules used must
be FIPS certified.

> At least in the US, FIPS 140-2 compliance is a reasonably
> common need, so if we can make it easier for people who have that need
> to be compliant, they are more likely to use PostgreSQL, which seems
> like something that we should want.

The proposed patch makes SCRAM+FIPS work for 14, question is if we need/want to
try and address v10-13.

cheers ./daniel

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