From: | Gregory Stark <stark(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
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To: | "Joe Conway" <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com> |
Cc: | "Tom Lane" <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, "Stephen Frost" <sfrost(at)snowman(dot)net>, "Magnus Hagander" <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, "Robert Treat" <xzilla(at)users(dot)sourceforge(dot)net>, "pgsql-patches" <pgsql-patches(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: dblink connection security |
Date: | 2007-07-09 03:09:54 |
Message-ID: | 87lkdqclx9.fsf@oxford.xeocode.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-patches |
"Joe Conway" <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com> writes:
> If there are no objections I'll commit this later today.
My objection is that I think we should still revoke access for non-superuser
by default. The patch makes granting execute reasonable for most users but
nonetheless it shouldn't be the default.
Being able to connect to a postgres server shouldn't mean being able to open
tcp connections *from* that server to arbitrary other host/ports. Consider for
example that it would allow a user to perform a port scan from inside your
network to see what internal services are running.
--
Gregory Stark
EnterpriseDB http://www.enterprisedb.com
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