From: | Gregory Stark <stark(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | "Robert Treat" <xzilla(at)users(dot)sourceforge(dot)net> |
Cc: | "Joe Conway" <mail(at)joeconway(dot)com>, "pgsql-patches" <pgsql-patches(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: dblink connection security |
Date: | 2007-07-01 18:36:23 |
Message-ID: | 87abugeztk.fsf@oxford.xeocode.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-patches |
"Robert Treat" <xzilla(at)users(dot)sourceforge(dot)net> writes:
>> In particular Postgres's "trust" authentication is one such system. It
>> authenticates connecting users based on the unix userid of the process
>> forming the connection. In typical configurations any user who is granted
>> execute access to dblink can form connections as the "postgres" user which
>> is the database super-user. If "trust" authentication is disabled this is
>> no longer an issue.
>
> Did you mean s/trust/ident/g, otherwise I don't think I understand the
> above... granted the combination of trust for localhost does open a door
> for remote users if they have access to dblink, but I don't think that's what
> you were trying to say.
Er quite right. Moreover it's not even true that ``"if "ident" authentication
is disabled this is no longer an issue''. It's still possible to have other
restrictions in pg_hba which dblink would allow you to circumvent. That
sentence is too generous of a promise.
--
Gregory Stark
EnterpriseDB http://www.enterprisedb.com
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