| From: | Florian Weimer <fw(at)deneb(dot)enyo(dot)de> |
|---|---|
| To: | Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org> |
| Cc: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre(at)commandprompt(dot)com>, Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au>, Devrim GUNDUZ <devrim(at)commandprompt(dot)com>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: Upcoming re-releases |
| Date: | 2006-02-11 17:21:04 |
| Message-ID: | 877j81ak1r.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
* Martijn van Oosterhout:
> Well, I guess it's an issue. At least it's not suceptable to the
> standard symlink attacks. There is in general no way of knowing if the
> server you are connecting to is what you think it is (except via SSL
> maybe?).
For local (i.e. UNIX domain socket) connections, there is -- just use
a hard-coded path where each directory is only writable by root or by
the PostgreSQL superuser (/var/run in Debian is not world-writable,
for instance).
> The good thing is that if you're using md5 auth they can't grab your
> password.
The password is probably of little concern if you use UNIX domain
sockets. But feeding wrong data to the application might trigger
interesting things.
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