From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
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To: | Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org> |
Cc: | Florian Weimer <fw(at)deneb(dot)enyo(dot)de>, "pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Upcoming re-releases |
Date: | 2006-02-11 16:41:01 |
Message-ID: | 8440.1139676061@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog(at)svana(dot)org> writes:
> These no real way around this. The only real option would be moving to
> a home directory but that would require knowing the username the server
> is running under...
And the problem would still exist, with even less chance of solution,
for TCP connections which are probably the majority of real-world usage.
If you're concerned about this sort of attack I think it has to be
solved in the protocol, not by reliance on socket placement.
I'm not sure whether our current SSL support does a good job of this
--- I think it only tries to check whether the server presents a
valid certificate, not which cert it is. Possibly Kerberos does more,
but I dunno a thing about that...
regards, tom lane
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