| From: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
|---|---|
| To: | Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> |
| Cc: | Kevin Grittner <Kevin(dot)Grittner(at)wicourts(dot)gov>, Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, Marko Kreen <markokr(at)gmail(dot)com>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, Greg Stark <gsstark(at)mit(dot)edu>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>, mlortiz <mlortiz(at)uci(dot)cu>, Albe Laurenz <laurenz(dot)albe(at)wien(dot)gv(dot)at> |
| Subject: | Re: Rejecting weak passwords |
| Date: | 2009-10-14 22:28:12 |
| Message-ID: | 7821.1255559292@sss.pgh.pa.us |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> writes:
> Tom Lane wrote:
>> But the main point is to hide the cleartext password, in any case.
> What if we added a GUC that only allowed password changes via an SSL
> connection.
How's that help? The user has already exposed their new choice of
password to any hypothetical eavesdropper. Of course, if they're smart,
they'll pick a different password before they try again on a secure
connection ... but good luck hoping for that.
(And, again, there is ABSOLUTELY NO NEED for us to put such debatable
policies into the core. Anyone who thinks that's a good idea can have
his password-check plugin enforce it.)
regards, tom lane
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