From: | Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net> |
---|---|
To: | Jelte Fennema <postgres(at)jeltef(dot)nl>, Jacob Champion <jchampion(at)timescale(dot)com> |
Cc: | Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>, thomas(at)habets(dot)se, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>, Bruce Momjian <bruce(at)momjian(dot)us> |
Subject: | Re: [PATCH] Add `verify-system` sslmode to use system CA pool for server cert |
Date: | 2023-01-09 15:40:34 |
Message-ID: | 731b02b9-890a-1190-3ee9-f98642a123de@dunslane.net |
Views: | Raw Message | Whole Thread | Download mbox | Resend email |
Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On 2023-01-09 Mo 10:07, Jelte Fennema wrote:
> Thanks for clarifying your reasoning. I now agree that ssrootcert=system
> is now the best option.
Cool, that looks like a consensus.
>
>>> 2. Should we allow the same approach with ssl_ca_file on the server side, for client cert validation?
>> I don't know enough about this use case to implement it safely. We'd
>> have to make sure the HBA entry is checking the hostname (so that we
>> do the reverse DNS dance), and I guess we'd need to introduce a new
>> clientcert verify-* mode? Also, it seems like server operators are
>> more likely to know exactly which roots they need, at least compared
>> to clients. I agree the feature is useful, but I'm not excited about
>> attaching it to this patchset.
I'm confused. A client cert might not have a hostname at all, and isn't
used to verify the connecting address, but to verify the username. It
needs to have a CN/DN equal to the user name of the connection, or that
maps to that name via pg_ident.conf.
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan
EDB: https://www.enterprisedb.com
From | Date | Subject | |
---|---|---|---|
Next Message | Pavel Stehule | 2023-01-09 15:50:29 | Re: PL/pgSQL cursors should get generated portal names by default |
Previous Message | Laurenz Albe | 2023-01-09 15:40:10 | Re: Postgres Partitions Limitations (5.11.2.3) |