From: | Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> |
---|---|
To: | Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
Cc: | Michael Paquier <michael(at)paquier(dot)xyz>, Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules |
Date: | 2024-04-26 22:50:54 |
Message-ID: | 6aedcaa5-60f3-49af-a857-2c76ba55a1f3@iki.fi |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On 23/04/2024 20:02, Jacob Champion wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2024 at 2:43 PM Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
>>
>> On 19/04/2024 19:48, Jacob Champion wrote:
>>> On Fri, Apr 19, 2024 at 6:56 AM Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
>>>> With direct SSL negotiation, we always require ALPN.
>>>
>>> (As an aside: I haven't gotten to test the version of the patch that
>>> made it into 17 yet, but from a quick glance it looks like we're not
>>> rejecting mismatched ALPN during the handshake as noted in [1].)
>>
>> Ah, good catch, that fell through the cracks. Agreed, the client should
>> reject a direct SSL connection if the server didn't send ALPN. I'll add
>> that to the Open Items so we don't forget again.
>
> Yes, the client should also reject, but that's not what I'm referring
> to above. The server needs to fail the TLS handshake itself with the
> proper error code (I think it's `no_application_protocol`?); otherwise
> a client implementing a different protocol could consume the
> application-level bytes coming back from the server and act on them.
> That's the protocol confusion attack from ALPACA we're trying to
> avoid.
I finally understood what you mean. So if the client supports ALPN, but
the list of protocols that it provides does not include 'postgresql',
the server should reject the connection with 'no_applicaton_protocol'
alert. Makes sense. I thought OpenSSL would do that with the alpn
callback we have, but it does not.
The attached patch makes that change. I used the alpn_cb() function in
openssl's own s_server program as example for that.
Unfortunately the error message you got in the client with that was
horrible (I modified the server to not accept the 'postgresql' protocol):
psql "dbname=postgres sslmode=require host=localhost"
psql: error: connection to server at "localhost" (::1), port 5432
failed: SSL error: SSL error code 167773280
This is similar to the case with system errors discussed at
https://postgr.es/m/b6fb018b-f05c-4afd-abd3-318c649faf18@highgo.ca, but
this one is equally bad on OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 3.3.0. It seems like an
OpenSSL bug to me, because there is an error string "no application
protocol" in the OpenSSL sources (ssl/ssl_err.c):
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL),
"no application protocol"},
and in the server log, you get that message. But the error code seen in
the client is different. There are also messages for other alerts, for
example:
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_MISSING_EXTENSION),
"tlsv13 alert missing extension"},
The bottom line is that that seems like a bug of omission to me in
OpenSSL, but I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for it to be fixed. We
can easily check for that error code and print the right message
ourselves however, as in the attached patch.
--
Heikki Linnakangas
Neon (https://neon.tech)
Attachment | Content-Type | Size |
---|---|---|
0001-Reject-SSL-connection-if-ALPN-is-used-but-there-s-no.patch | text/x-patch | 2.8 KB |
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