From: | Ron <ronljohnsonjr(at)gmail(dot)com> |
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To: | pgsql-general <pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: pgbackrest - hiding the encryption password |
Date: | 2021-05-19 18:37:00 |
Message-ID: | 601786c6-f601-81d1-0cff-5bdd783c96dd@gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-general |
On 5/19/21 1:33 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> * Ron (ronljohnsonjr(at)gmail(dot)com) wrote:
>> Currently on our RHEL 7.8 system, /etc/pgbackrest.conf is root:root and 633
>> perms. Normally, that's ok, but is a horrible idea when it's a plaintext
>> file, and stores the pgbackrest encryption password.
>>
>> Would pgbackrest (or something else) break if I change it to
>> postgres:postgres 600 perms?
> As long as it can be read by the user performing backups/restores and
> archive-push/archive-get, it should be fine.
>
>> Is there a better way of hiding the password so that only user postgres can
>> see it?
> This is a bit like asking how to 'hide' the encrypted private key for
> SSL/TLS. Anywhere you hide it, if you want things to actually work in
> an automated fashion, is also going to need to be available all the
> time.. In particular, archive-push gets run a lot and you don't want
> that to fail or to wait for someone to provide an encryption key.
That's what I figured. Thanks.
--
Angular momentum makes the world go 'round.
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