From: | KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com> |
---|---|
To: | Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> |
Cc: | Sam Mason <sam(at)samason(dot)me(dot)uk>, pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org |
Subject: | Re: [HACKERS] libpq port number handling |
Date: | 2009-09-25 01:24:34 |
Message-ID: | 4ABC1BD2.2060308@ak.jp.nec.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-general pgsql-hackers |
Tom Lane wrote:
> Sam Mason <sam(at)samason(dot)me(dot)uk> writes:
>> + if (portnum < 1 || portnum > 65535)
>
> BTW, it strikes me that we could tighten this even more by rejecting
> target ports below 1024. This is guaranteed safe on all Unix systems
> I know of, because privileged ports can only be listened to by root-owned
> processes and we know the postmaster won't be one.
This is just an aside.
The recent Linux system allows to assign a part of root privileges (called
as capabilities) on a certain process.
Example)
# setcap cap_net_bind_service=ep /usr/local/pgsql/bin/postgres
<-- it allows anyone to launch postmaster with cap_net_bind_service capability.
$ pg_ctl -o "-i -p 100" start
$ psql postgres -p 100
psql (8.5devel)
Type "help" for help.
postgres=#
> Even if it's possible, do we want to allow it?
I cannot find any merits.
Thanks,
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai(at)ak(dot)jp(dot)nec(dot)com>
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