Re: postgresql.key secure storage

From: John R Pierce <pierce(at)hogranch(dot)com>
To: pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org
Subject: Re: postgresql.key secure storage
Date: 2009-09-13 18:17:30
Message-ID: 4AAD373A.2090306@hogranch.com
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Saleem EDAH-TALLY wrote:
> This concerns use of postgresql.key private key file on the client side.
>
> psql can't establish a connection. with an encrypted postgresql.key file. If
> I'm wrong here, the following is invalid and please show me the steps I'm
> ignoring.
>
> An application using libpq would require that the private unencrypted key be
> deployed to the end user, together with the public key and trust cert. This
> would mean if the end user is curious enough and computer litterate, he can
> bypass the client application and make a direct connection to the server with
> psql for example. It's then possible to issue commands like TRUNCATE TABLE...
>
sounds like you should be using a 3-tier architecture, where the
application running on the untrusted user computer isn't allowed to
directly connect to the database at all, rather, connects to middleware
on a secured computer which executes all business logic and makes any
database connections.

of course, this moves the security issues to your client->server
application protocol

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