From: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net> |
---|---|
To: | Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net> |
Cc: | PG Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: SSL over Unix-domain sockets |
Date: | 2009-03-25 13:27:32 |
Message-ID: | 49CA3144.3020304@gmx.net |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
Magnus Hagander wrote:
>> I imagine for example, we could invent an additional sslmode of the sort
>> prefer-but-not-if-local-socket, which could be the default.
>
> That parameter is already pretty complex, not sure it's a great idea to
> make it even more so :(
I think there is a firm difference between complex and having a large
number of things to choose from. By your definition, a float type would
be a complex. Uh ... hahah.
> Perhaps it's enough to add a "localssl" row to pg_hba.conf?
That defeats the point, I think. You don't want the server to determine
whether the client should verify the server.
>> The other question is whether sslverify=cn makes sense, but that may be
>> up to the user to find out.
>
> Without finding a way to have that make sense, you don't actually fix
> the potential MITM problem (at least not in many common scenarios), so I
> think that needs to be considered before we put anything in.
Yeah, the problem is that there is only one server certificate. Is it
possible/does it make sense to add an additional cn to the certificate?
Another thought I had is to somehow employ hostaddr, as in
"hostaddr=/tmp host=real.hostname.lan".
Another^2 thought is to just examine the certificate for the local host
name, which the client can find out itself.
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