From: | Kevin Hunter <hunteke(at)earlham(dot)edu> |
---|---|
To: | Kenneth Downs <ken(at)secdat(dot)com> |
Cc: | PostgreSQL General List <pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: HIPPA (was Re: Anyone know ...) |
Date: | 2007-03-09 16:29:28 |
Message-ID: | 45F18B68.90500@earlham.edu |
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Thread: | |
Lists: | pgsql-general |
>>> First, security is defined directly in terms of tables, it is not
>>> arbitrated by code. The "public" group has SELECT access to the
>>> articles table and the schedules tables, that's it. If a person
>>> figures out how our links work and tries to access the "claims" table
>>> it will simply come up blank (and we get an email).
> If a user has not logged in, that is, if they are an anonymous visitor,
> the web framework will connect to the database as the default "public"
> user. Our system is deny-by-default, so this user cannot actually read
> from any table unless specifically granted permission. In the case
> being discussed, the public user is given SELECT permission on some
> columns of the insurance carriers table, and on the schedules table.
Huh. Does that imply that the web framework still holds a number of
different DB credentials? Or does each user need to supply their
specific DB credentials as their authentication so the web framework is
merely a proxy to the DB?
(Having recently discovered a major security oversight in one of my
employer's webapps, my mind's hot on this kind of thing.)
Kevin
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