Re: PCI:SSF - Safe SQL Query & operators filter

From: Jan Bilek <jan(dot)bilek(at)eftlab(dot)com(dot)au>
To: Christophe Pettus <xof(at)thebuild(dot)com>
Cc: "pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org" <pgsql-general(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: PCI:SSF - Safe SQL Query & operators filter
Date: 2022-11-08 01:43:02
Message-ID: 33a762ed-a045-c1e5-a042-cd4903f7de4b@eftlab.com.au
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On 11/8/22 11:29, Christophe Pettus wrote:
>
>> On Nov 7, 2022, at 17:24, Jan Bilek <jan(dot)bilek(at)eftlab(dot)com(dot)au> wrote:
>> Would there be any way to go around this?
> The typical configuration is to not permit the PostgreSQL superuser to log in remotely. The database can be managed by a different, non-superuser role, including schema migrations.
Well, superuser (our App) is already logged in and as it is designed
very much as an "appliance" it simply does that job - manages its
database. There might be a way to explore whether we can use internally
another (limited) user just for reporting queries on a different
connection session. But I am getting (security related) headaches just
thinking about it.
>
>> CREATE OR REPLACE LANGUAGE plpython3u;
>> HINT: Must be superuser to create this extension.
> The reason only a superuser can create this extension is the "u" at the end of the name: It is an untrusted PL that can bypass PostgreSQL's role system. If anyone could create functions in it, anyone could bypass roles.

Yes, agreed. Any ideas?

--
Jan Bilek - CTO at EFTlab Pty Ltd.

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